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SUMMARY

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6. Communists reportedly sabotage postal communications with Belgian troops in Korea (page 6).

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tons of gra	In addition, Indian Ambassador Panikkar in Peiping has informed the British Charge that he has negotiated a long-term contract for the purchase from China of 500,000 to 1,000,000 in for a six-month period beginning 1 May 1951. Panikkar
and US Em a political	hether British shipping would be available to move the grain, abassy London reports that the British have no objection from point of view. US Embassy New Delhi also states that Soviet re telling the Government of India that "any amount" of
Soviet when made for a that it is co	at is available for delivery to India if arrangements can be barter deal. The Indian Government has informed the Embass onsidering the above offers as a means of assuring the Indian
that the US requested.	t least minimum food requirements, in view of the uncertainty will furnish the 2,000,000 tons of food grains which India has
have the ca	Comment: These Soviet and Chinese Commuappear to be part of a campaign to take the initiative from providing special food supplies to India. China and the USSR apability to furnish and ship 2,000,000 tons of grain to India next year. Communist governments in the past have demon-
pursuit of i in India to ments of So press to dr	ir willingness to ignore the welfare of their people in the important political objectives. Favorable publicity accorded recent arrivals of Chinese rice suggests that even token shiptivity or Chinese Communist grain will be used by the Indian aw critical comparisons between the efforts of the West and nist bloc to prevent starvation in India.
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Peurifoy, the Greek Prime Minister implied that he wished the US to advise him regarding his reply to Yugoslavia.

Comment: The reported demarche by Yugo-slavia contrasts with its previous attitude in dealings with Greece, since it opens the way for military talks between the two countries. During the early March negotiations for the exchange of military attaches between Yugoslavia and Greece, the Yugoslav Minister explained that, although the community of interests between the two countries was clear, there was no necessity to coordinate military preparations, since this could be accomplished in a short time when the occasion arose. The Yugoslavs have, heretofore, been extremely careful to avoid any action which would appear to justify Cominform charges that the Tito regime and the Greek "Monarcho-Fascists" were coordinating their military plans. The reported demarche may, therefore, reflect increased Yugoslav apprehension regarding the possibility of a Soviet-Satellite attack.

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administration.

FAR EAST

4. Republic of Korea interested in extending administration north of the 38th Parallel:

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the Prime Minister of the Republic of Korea recently called on the Turkish chairman of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea to ask about the Commission's position on the question of administering North Korean territory which may be liberated in the future. Reportedly, the Prime Minister expressed the wish that the Commission agree that the Republic of Korea has the

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the position that the liberated areas should be under military

right to appoint local administrators and to insure public order through the use of its police forces. The chairman was noncommittal but took

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Comment: A similar problem arose when UN forces advanced into North Korea last October. This is the first instance this year, however, of renewed Republic of Korea interest in administering liberated North Korean territory. The Prime Minister's inquiry is a further indication of his government's determination to eradicate the 38th Parallel as a political boundary and to extend its authority to the Yalu River.

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sabotaging communications between the volunteers in Korea and their families. Communists have infiltrated the Ministry of Communications so successfully that letters to Belgian soldiers in Korea have been burned by Communist-influenced postmen. Because of the reluctance of the Minister of Communications (who is concurrently the Acting Prime Minister) to admit that this state of affairs exists in his ministry, the Belgian press and public are apparently unaware of the situation.

Comment: It is believed that Communist influence in the Belgian Government has become negligible since the immediate postwar period. It seems unlikely that the facts of this case would not have leaked to the press, if Communist sabotage activities had been as successful as this report suggests. Furthermore, the Minister's reluctance to take action does not seem plausible in view of the government's aggressive anti-Communist campaign (which has included the dismissal of employees actively combining Communist activities with their government positions).

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